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Stopping the Clock on Coverage: Resolving the
Conundrum of LHWCA Maritime Status
INTRODUCTION
As far back as the Grecian and Roman empires, civilizations recognized
the unparalleled economic gain offered by trade on the high seas and created
systems to harness that profit. The ancient Greeks and Romans built their
empires on maritime commerce. The Roman Empire thrived on its
commercial ships, which carried up to 400 tons of cargo in a single vessel to
merchant ports throughout the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Atlantic
Ocean.1 In short time, the competing commercial interests that arose between
merchants, shippers, and laborers required laws regulating their interactions.
Thus, the Romans developed their own maritime law by borrowing from the
precepts of Grecian, and more specifically Rhodian, law of the sea.2 Greek
culture and Greek courts alike revered and protected maritime commerce; that
reverence became a cornerstone of admiralty law.3
Centuries after the Greeks and Romans flourished, the search for
maritime trade routes to the Far East prompted the discovery of the Americas.
For colonists in the New World, ports became the gateway for all commerce.
Soon, cities grew up around major ports. Colonists built railways and roads to
connect these port cities, crisscrossing the expanse between the coasts and
carrying goods and people into the heartland. This network of passageways
that intended to achieve ease of access to ports contributed to the growing
recognition of the American colonies as an interconnected whole. Upon
gaining independence, maritime commerce and its law remained so integral
to America’s burgeoning identity as a unified nation that the Framers
expressly provided for federal admiralty jurisdiction in the Constitution itself.4
That federal jurisdiction controls the operation of an industry woven through
the fabric of American life and trade, and, in so doing, governs the safety and
well–being of an army of American maritime laborers.

Copyright 2015, by ALEX S. AUGHTRY.
1. Lionel Casson, Ships And Seafaring Vessels in Ancient Times 105
(University of Texas Press, 1994). In his most recognized work, Parallel Lives,
Plutarch described how Cato the Elder (234–149 B.C.) organized associations of
investors that engaged in the joint venture of underwriting ships for profit.
Plutarch, Cato the Elder, in Makers of Rome 144 (Ian Scott-Kilvert trans., 1965).
2. Dig. 14.2.9 (Volsusius Maecianus, From the Rhodian Law) (Alan Watson
trans.).
3. See generally Edward E. Cohen, Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts (1973).
4. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
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Even after the industrial revolution and the dawning of the
technological age,5 the maritime industry remains solidly at the foundation
of the American economy. The contemporary United States maritime
industry encompasses over 40,000 vessels and provides jobs to
approximately 13 million Americans.6 Producing a $100 billion economic
output each year, the industry yields $29 billion in wages and $11 billion
in taxes annually.7 Moreover, roughly thirty percent of the national
economy depends on imports and exports8—ninety-five percent of which
are transported by sea.9 It is not surprising, then, that the maritime industry
still drives Americans’ understanding of both the domestic economy and
the country’s interactions with the rest of the world.
Maritime trade and transport does not happen on its own. The industry
thrives through the sweat—and sometimes the blood—of hardworking
men and women. The work of the maritime laborer remains difficult and
dangerous. In 2005, the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs
received roughly 27,000 reports of on-the-job injuries from longshoremen
and harbor workers alone.10 Since maritime workers make up such a large
portion of the working population, and because the industry remains so
vital to the American economy, the need to protect workers injured in
furtherance of maritime commerce is crucial. With this very interest in
mind, Congress conceived the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act (LHWCA) in 1927.11
Unfortunately, ambiguities regarding the scope of coverage have
plagued the LHWCA since its inception. The confusion surrounding
LHWCA coverage first centered largely on a lack of clarity as to the extent
of the Act’s jurisdiction. The murkiness surrounding coverage led Justice
5. Maritime commercial efforts now incorporate advanced technologies to
track shipments and port activity, monitor weather and traffic on the seas, and to
ensure security in the shipping industry, among other things. See Michael S.
Bruno, Port Security and Technology: The US Perspective, Stevens Institute of
Technology, www.oceanologyinternational.com/RXUK/RXUK [https://perma
.cc/A7ZH-9RCB](Mar. 12, 2012).
6. Americas Maritime Industry: The Foundation of American Seapower,
Navy League of the United States 7, 13, http://www.seapowermagazine.org/pdf
_files/americas-maritime-industry.pdf [http://perma.cc/P5WY-H9EK] (last
visited October 24, 2014) [hereinafter Navy League].
7. Id. at 14.
8. World Trade-to-GDP Ratios, The World Bank (2015), http://data.world
bank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS.
9. Navy League, supra note 6, at 13.
10. DLHWC Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of Labor http://www.dol.gov/owcp
/dlhwc/lsfact.htm [http://perma.cc/56FC-ZGNE] (last visited October 5, 2014).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 901–950. In a lay sense, longshoremen and harbor workers
are those land-based workers that facilitate maritime commerce once a boat has
reached the pier.
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Brennan to label the 1927 Act “a jurisdictional monstrosity.”12 One
lawmaker characterized the Act as “about as unclear as any statute could
conceivably be.”13 Regrettably, steps taken to increase clarity ultimately
gave birth to new ambiguities, only amplifying the already complicated
application of the law.
Jurisdictional problems have commonly arisen in determining who is
actually covered by the LHWCA. As with any specialized compensation
structure, “there will always be a boundary to coverage, and there will
always be people who cross it during their employment.”14 Today, the
boundary questions revolve around the connection between the injured
worker and actual maritime duties. In particular, tension exists in assessing
the worker’s temporal connection to maritime tasks and the reach of that
connection.
The health of the maritime industry and its workers depends upon
resolving that tension. The expeditious and economical provision of
benefits in a workers’ compensation structure rises and falls on ease of
application. Until a clear line of coverage can be drawn, both workers and
employers will continue to suffer from the lack of predictability and
uniformity in LHWCA enforcement, and workers will have to fight for
benefits. Disputes over whether coverage applies can be tied up in courts
for years, depriving injured employees of financial resources at the time
when they need them most. Further, these disputes hurt their employers as
well, prolonging disputes, costs, and ill will. Unclear lines of coverage
harm maritime businesses, and in turn harm the American maritime
industry as a whole. The wasted costs stemming from the vagaries of the
LHWCA incentivize diversion of trade—and profits—to other countries
with less onerous coverage structures.15 Failure to resolve the gray areas
of coverage under the Act threatens to degrade an industry that has long
been a bastion of the American economy. A clear and predictable line must
be drawn to stop the harm felt by all parties.
This comment argues that Congress should adopt a bright line standard
that refines the temporal restriction urged by Judge Clement in her
concurring opinion in New Orleans Depot Services, Inc. v. Director, Office
of Worker's Compensation Programs,16 into a workable rule.17 Part I
12. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 720 (1980).
13. Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments
of 1981: Hearing on S. 1182 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. On
Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong. 5 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Hearing]
(statement of Don Nickles, Senator of Oklahoma).
14. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 223–24 (1969).
15. For a more thorough explanation of the threat of diversion, see infra Part
II, Section C.
16. 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Clement, J. concurring).
17. Id.
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examines the origins and creation of the LHWCA. Part II discusses the
1972 Amendments to the Act, exploring both the issues Congress set out
to remedy and the new questions created by its enactment. Part III delves
more deeply into the resulting “status test,” examining its importance in
determining LHWCA eligibility.18 Part IV highlights the question of
temporality created by the status test and emphasized by Judge Clement.
Finally, Part V advocates a statutory revision of the definition of
“employee” in order to clarify congressional intent and further the best
interests of the shipping industry, its employees, and the national
economy.
Pending enactment of that bright line rule, this article gathers the
growing authorities that warrant its adoption by the courts and urges
adoption as the best—if not only—way to ensure effective provision of the
benefits the LHWCA seeks to afford. While it is true that the status test
still suffers confounding ambiguities—and that those ambiguities threaten
the health of the maritime industry—this attainable and workable solution
is already percolating in admiralty law. The following pages will
crystallize that cure and provide advocates with effective tools for tackling
the conundrum of LHWCA coverage through interpretation of existing
case law and legislation.
I. BORN OUT OF NEED: THE CREATION OF THE LHWCA
Prior to the 20th century, laborers generally had no realistic claim of
action against their employers for injuries sustained in the course of their
work.19 The rise of the Industrial Revolution created new and pervasive
dangers for workers, and the resulting injuries became increasingly severe:
“By the turn of the century . . . it became apparent that the toll of industrial
accidents of both the avoidable and unavoidable variety had become
18. 33 U.S.C. § 902.
19. Aubrey E. Denton & John H. Hughes, Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation in Louisiana 3 (National Business Institute, 1995). The lack of
action resulted largely from the “fellow servant rule,” which barred damage
actions arising from the negligence or fault of a fellow servant. See, e.g. Nappa v.
Erie R. Co., 195 N.Y. 176 (1909). Another obstacle to recovery was the equitable
theory of contributory negligence, which barred liability of employers where an
injury resulted at least partially from the workers’ own carelessness, unless the
employer’s negligence was gross, willful, or wanton. See, e.g., Schirm v. Dene
Steam Shipping Co., 222 F. 587 (E.D.N.Y. 1914). See also, Wex S. Malone,
Louisiana Workmen’s Compensations Law and Practice 7 (West Publishing Co.,
1951). To add insult to injury, the common law assumption of the risk doctrine
barred remedy in many cases on the ground that the employee knowingly
encountered certain dangers while in the course of employment, and was “deemed
to accept all ‘ordinary’ or ‘usual’ risks.” See, e.g., The Maharajah, 49 F. 111 (2d
Cir. N.Y.1891). See also id., at 11–12.

2015]

COMMENT

147

enormous, and government was faced with the problem of who was to pay
for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry.”20
A. Protecting the Unprotected
In the area of maritime employment, admiralty law afforded special
remedies to injured maritime workers who fell into the category of seamen—
but no specialized coverage existed for their land-based counterparts,
longshoremen and harbor workers.21 Most assumed that these workers would
be covered by state workers’ compensation acts.22
But in 1917, the Supreme Court rejected this assumption, denying
coverage under a New York state compensation statute to a worker killed
on the gangway during the process of loading and unloading cargo.23 The
Court reasoned that injuries over navigable waters were subject solely to
federal jurisdiction under admiralty law; application of a state
compensation structure to an injury over water would directly conflict with
that jurisdiction.24 The case resulted in what famously came to be known
as the “Jensen line,” drawn strictly at the water’s edge. Longshoremen
injured on the portion of the pier with pilings on land were covered by
state compensation acts, but once they crossed over the Jensen line to the

20. Malone, supra note 19, at 32. To illustrate, forty-six workers were killed
in the South Chicago United States Steel Corporation factory in 1906. Carl
Gersuny, Work Injuries and Adversary Processes in Two New England Textile
Mills, 51 The Bus. History Rev. 337 (1977). A shocking 526 men were killed in
one year in the course of employment in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania: 125
rail-workers, 71 miners, and 195 steel workers. Id. For more information on labor
conditions and the viability of compensation actions during the industrial
revolution, see Arthur F. McEvoy’s essay on the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire
that killed 146 people, with 62 victims jumping to their deaths. The Triangle
Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911: Social Change, Industrial Accidents, and the
Evolution of Common-Sense Causality, 20 Law and Social Inquiry 621–51
(Spring, 1995). McEvoy explains: “The fire symbolized the helplessness of
industrial workers in the face of dangers over which they had little control and to
which the law had hitherto, for the most part, simply abandoned them. It made
clear in a new and powerful way that industrial accidents had causes whose roots
lay in employers’ near-total power over the workplace environment; causes which
government had the capacity and the responsibility to address.” Id. at 622.
21. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) (granting a right to seamen to
recover for injuries sustained as a result of the “un-seaworthiness” of the vessel).
The Osceola’s distinction of seamen was left undefined by the Court, but was
designed to distinguish sailors from their land-based brethren. Denton, supra note
19, at 3 (interpreting Osceola, 189 U.S.).
22. Denton, supra note 19, at 3. See, e.g., Sabella v. Brazileiro, 86 N.J.L. 505
(1914).
23. So. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 208 (1917).
24. Id. at 216–17.
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seaward side of the pier, they were left with no remedy.25
Congress twice attempted to cure this anomaly through legislation. In two
separate acts, Congress expressly extended state workers’ compensation
structures over navigable waters.26 However, the Supreme Court struck down
both of these acts as unconstitutional usurpations of state power, as the federal
government could not dictate the coverage applied by state-created law. 27
Moreover, extending state statutes into maritime jurisdiction would interfere
with the express grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal government.28
The Court reasoned that the Founders established admiralty jurisdiction
specifically to ensure the uniformity of law required to foster free movement
of both domestic and foreign powers upon the navigable waters.29 Allowing
disparate legislation in waters according to state lines would destroy that
uniformity.30 In dicta in Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Company, the Court
invited legislators to create a federal compensation structure that would not
interfere with states’ rights or the federal admiralty jurisdiction.31
Responding to the Court’s suggestion that “what Congress could not
empower the States to do, it could do itself,” Congress enacted the
LHWCA in 1927.32 By passing the LHWCA, Congress finally succeeded
in accomplishing what it had tried to do through its earlier acts: creating a
compensation remedy for longshoremen injured over navigable waters
that avoided interference with state remedies.33
25. State Industrial Comm’n of State of New York v. Nordenholt Corp., 259
U.S. 263, 273 (1922).
26. Act of October 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395 (invalidated 1920); Act of
June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634 (invalidated 1924).
27. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v.
W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924). For a more thorough discussion of
these Acts and cases, see Marian Mayer, Workmen’s Compensation Law in
Louisiana 124–26 (Louisiana State University Press, 1937).
28. W.C. Dawson, 264 U.S. at 227 (“Without doubt Congress has power to
alter, amend or revise the maritime law by statutes of general application
embodying its will and judgment. This power, we think, would permit enactment
of a general employers' liability law or general provisions for compensating
injured employees; but it may not be delegated to the several States.”).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 280, 14 S. Ct. 109, 121,
37 L. Ed. 1071 (1893).
30. Id. at 228 (“[T]he Union was formed with the very definite design of
freeing maritime commerce from intolerable restrictions incident to such control.
The subject is national. Local interest must yield to the common welfare.”).
31. Id. at 227.
32. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 216 (1969). See also
Hearings on S. 3170 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 18, 31, 103 and n. 3 (1926); Hearing on H.R.
9498 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 16,
pp. 18, 119 and n. 3 (1926).
33. Id.
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B. Coverage Designed to Fill the Gap
The LHWCA created a federal no-fault system of compensation for
longshoremen and harbor workers.34 Benefits under the Act were highly
structured, limiting damages to pecuniary losses, including lost earnings,
and medical and rehabilitation expenses.35 Injured workers relinquished
claims for non-pecuniary damages such as pain and suffering in exchange
for no-fault liability.36
In its original form, the LHWCA only provided coverage for injuries
occurring over navigable waters, with land-based injuries covered through
state compensation proceedings.37 This framework evinced Congress’ sole
intent to fill the gap in coverage created by the Jensen line.38 A worker
injured on the deck of a ship while loading cargo could now recover for his
resulting expenses and lost wages under the LHWCA. However, if that
worker sustained injury while working on the loading dock, he was expected
to seek compensation through the benefits of the state where the injury
occurred. The LHWCA was “designed to ensure that a compensation
remedy existed for all injuries sustained by non-seaman maritime
employees [of statutory employers] on navigable waters, and to avoid
uncertainty as to the source, state or federal, of that remedy.”39
C. An Insufficient Remedy with Unforeseen Effects
Unfortunately, the LHWCA effectively served to reduce the remedies
available to longshoremen. The problem resulted from Congress’ specific
incorporation of the Jensen line into the text of the LHWCA.40 While any
covered laborer injured over navigable waters could recover benefits
regardless of the nature of his work, laborers in the “maritime but local”
area—the area occupied by maritime employment but still covered by state
34. 33 U.S.C. § 901, et. seq. (1927). See also, Denton, supra note 19, at 5.
35. 33 U.S.C. §§ 906–910 (2013). See also, F. Nash Bilisoly, The
Relationship of Status and Damages in Maritime Personal Injury Cases, 72 Tul.
L. Rev. 493, 526 (1997).
36. Bilisoly, supra note 35, at 526.
37. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 258 (1977).
38. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459
U.S. 297, 338 (1983) (Stevens, dissenting). The Supreme Court later expanded its
interpretation of the LHWCA. See Davis v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 317 U.S.
249 (1942) (acknowledging the “twilight zone” between state and federal
compensation structures and asserting concurrent jurisdiction); Sun Ship v.
Pennsylvania., 447 U.S. 715 (1980) (holding that the LHWCA does not supplant
state workers’ compensation remedies, but rather supplements them).
39. Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U.S. 114, 124 (1962).
40. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 220 (1969) (citing
Davis v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 317 U.S. 249, 256 (1942)).
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compensation structures—could not.41 This lack of coverage resulted from the
1927 Act’s provision allowing compensation only if it “may not validly be
provided by State law.”42 Therefore, injuries to longshoremen and harbor
workers were only covered past the water’s edge. This gap in coverage was
particularly troublesome due to the amphibious nature of the employment the
Act sought to cover. Determination of coverage relied entirely on where the
accident in question occurred.43 The result was a system in which workers
were frequently “walking in and out of coverage.”44
A number of problems stemmed from these conflicting coverage
structures. First, a significant disparity existed between state and federal
remedies.45 Workers injured over water received substantially better
benefits than their counterparts with analogous injuries occurring on the
pier. This incongruity served to “exacerbate the harshness of the already
unpopular Jensen line.”46 Second, technological advances, like the
containerization of cargo, moved many of the duties conducted by
41. Perini, 459 U.S. at 311 (citing G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of
Admiralty 429–430 (2d ed. 1975)). As the Supreme Court explained,“[i]f the
employment of an injured worker was determined to have no “direct relation” to
navigation or commerce, and “the operation of local law [would not] materially
affect” the uniformity of maritime law, then the employment would be
characterized as “maritime but local,” and the state could provide a compensation
remedy. If the employment could not be characterized as “maritime but local,”
then the injured employee would be left without a compensation remedy.” Dir.,
Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Perini N. River
Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 306, 103 S. Ct. 634, 641, 74 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1983) (citing
Grant Smith-Porter v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 477, 42 S.Ct. 157, 158, 66 L.Ed. 321
(1922). See also Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242, 42 S.Ct. 89, 90,
66 L.Ed. 210 (1921)). The maritime but local doctrine developed during the
jurisdictional quagmire that followed Jensen, and was later incorporated into the
passage of the LHWCA. See, e.g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233
(1921). See also, Denton, supra note 19, at 6.
42. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 38 (1932).
43. Perini, 459 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, dissenting).
44. Id. See also, Clare R. Pitre, Muddy Waters—Clarifying Maritime
Coverage Under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 59 Loy.
L. Rev. 981, 998 (2013). Justice Douglas pointed out the absurdity of this rule in
his dissent to Nacirema, 396 U.S. at 225 (Douglas, dissenting). While the three
workers in that case were denied LHWCA coverage because they were injured on
the pier while loading a ship, the Court of Appeals had affirmed granting LHWCA
benefits to the widow of a fourth injured worker in that same case. Id. That worker
had also been struck while working on the pier, but the blow had knocked him
into the water. Id. Since he technically died while in navigable waters, LHWCA
applied. Id. The lesson to be learned from this result: the unlucky workers in
Nacirema were denied coverage due to their failure to be fortuitously knocked
into the water and drowned.
45. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 262 (1977) (asserting
that state workers’ compensation benefits were inadequate).
46. Id.
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longshoremen and harbor workers onshore, barring a great number of
claims that would traditionally have been covered by the LHWCA at the
time of its enactment.47
Perhaps most vexing, applying the “maritime but local” doctrine
necessitated a case-by-case assessment of which coverage system applied
at the site of any given injury.48 With any luck, a worker who sustained
injury over navigable waters could recover the superior benefits offered
by the LHWCA. In contrast, if the injury occurred on the pier, that
unfortunate worker was stuck with the subpar benefits offered by the state
compensation statute. Further complication arose when the injury was not
an isolated incident that occurred in a finite place. For instance, if the
worker suffered exposure to a hazardous substance in the loading process,
or if he injured his back in the course of a long day of unloading heavy
cargo, where did that injury occur? It would be difficult, if not impossible,
to say whether harm occurred on land or over water.
As a result of this uncertainty, both employers and employees alike
were “often required to make a perilous jurisdictional guess as to which of
two mutually exclusive compensation schemes was applicable to cover his
injury.”49 A claim for injury brought under the wrong system could be tied
up in lengthy litigation, resulting at best in an untimely provision of
benefits and expensive legal fees, and at worst in barring of the suit under
the statute of limitations, with no recourse for recovery. Furthermore, the
1927 construction of the LHWCA created a “twilight zone of overlapping
jurisdiction,” wherein employers had to carry duplicative insurance
policies to ensure their workers were covered during the entirety of their
employment.50
II. THE 1972 AMENDMENTS: COLORING OUTSIDE OF THE JENSEN LINE
Prodded by the growing consternation concerning LHWCA
application in the courts and in practice, Congress sought to cure many of
the problems surrounding the Jensen line through amendment in 1972. The
new legislation aimed to eliminate the risk of “walking in and out of
coverage” borne by amphibious longshoremen and harbor workers.
Congress had to devise an effective plan to mitigate the rigidity imposed
47. Id. For more information on the development, implementation, and
effects of container shipping, see John Tomlinson, History and Impact of the
Intermodal Shipping Container, Pratt Institute (September 22, 2009),
http://www.johntomlinson.com/docs/history_and_impact_of_shipping_container
.pdf [http://perma.cc/4WGG-NSF9].
48. Perini, 459 U.S. at 307 (1983).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 339 (Stevens, dissenting).
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by the Jensen line while maintaining the initial intent of the LHWCA to
cover a specific class of maritime workers. With that goal in mind,
Congress devised an expanded test to determine beneficiary eligibility.
The new test managed to address many of the problems posed by the 1927
Act but bore with it new and unforeseen challenges.
A. “An Affirmative Exercise of Admiralty Jurisdiction”: Correcting
Inconsistent Coverage
Congress primarily intended these amendments to improve the
LHWCA’s benefit structure. The amendments were in part a reaction to
the prompts of the Supreme Court in Nacirema Operating Company v.
Johnson, which affirmed the boundary of LHWCA coverage along the
Jensen line.51 There, the Court asserted that since Congress explicitly
chose the Jensen line in its drafting of the 1927 Act, the Court could not
depart from that standard in determining coverage: “The invitation to
move that line landward must be addressed to Congress, not to this
Court.”52
Congress responded by enacting the 1972 Amendments. In doing so,
they embraced the argument set forth in Justice Douglas’ dissent to
Nacirema regarding the evolution of the LHWCA: “No longer is the Act
viewed as merely filling in the interstices around the shore line of the state
acts, but rather as an affirmative exercise of admiralty jurisdiction.”53
The 1972 Amendments served as a direct assertion that the “walking
in and out of coverage” phenomenon was antithetical to the idea of the no-

51. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4700. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396
U.S. 212, 223–24 (1969). The 1972 Amendments served two other purposes. 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698. First, in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946),
the Supreme Court held the owner of a ship liable when a worker not employed
by the owner sustained injury on board. The result was that longshoremen could
potentially recover twice: once from their employer and once from the owner of
the vessel. In the 1972 Amendments, Congress eliminated the strict-liability
unseaworthiness remedy against the owner of the ship. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1972).
Similarly, in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124
(1956), the Court upheld an indemnity claim by the owner of a vessel against a
stevedoring company when the vessel’s employee was injured as the result of the
stevedoring company’s failure to secure cargo. Congress eliminated such
indemnity claims in 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1972). The overriding policy in these
amendments is that the employer of the injured claimant takes responsibility for
compensation under the LHWCA. Further exploration of these amendments is not
germane to the present discussion.
52. Nacirema, 396 U.S. at 223–24.
53. Id. at 224 (Douglas, dissenting) (quoting Michigan Mutual Liability Co.
v. Arrien, D.C., 233 F.Supp. 496, 500, aff'd, 2d Cir., 344 F.2d 640).
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fault, strict liability structure of workers’ compensation laws.54 In the
course of hearings before the House of Representatives, one legislator
opined, “[t]he longshoremen are the only workers in the United States who
must worry about their injury to determine the compensation . . . . It is time
for a Federal law for compensation for all longshoremen.”55 The House
Report, in explaining the purpose of the legislation, asserted that
“compensation payable to a longshoreman or a ship repairman or builder
should not depend on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the injury
occurred on land or over water.”56
Congress highlighted the inadequacy of state benefits to underline the
importance of changing the LHWCA.57 If injury occurred on the pier, the
worker would be deprived of the funds necessary to effectively compensate
him for his loss. Congress took offense at the principle that the site of an
accident dictated radical differences in coverage for the same worker
performing the same function.58
B. Expanding and Constraining Coverage through a Two-Prong Test
By amending two sections of the LHWCA, Congress converted the
accident-situs test into a two-pronged conjunctive test, with an expanded
situs component and a new maritime status component.59 First, Congress
redefined “employee” in Section 902 as including “any person engaged in
maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person
engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker including a
ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-breaker . . . .”60 On that foundation,
54. Strict liability mitigated the burden of extensive litigation related to the
precise specifics of a given injury by providing blanket coverage to workers
injured during the course of employment. Requiring a case-by-case assessment of
where and how a work-related injury occurred in order to determine LHWCA
coverage directly contradicted that goal.
55. 1981 Hearing, supra note 13, at 5.
56. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4708.
57. Id. at 4707. State laws fell far short of meeting the nationally
recommended standard of benefits under workers’ compensation structures; the
maximum limit suggested at the time was not less than 200% of statewide average
weekly wages. Id.
58. Id. at 4707–08. Congress also pointed to the effects of containerization
and the use of LASH-type vessels moving a substantial amount of the
longshoremen’s work onshore. Id.
59. As referenced in the LHWCA and other workers’ compensation statutes,
situs refers to the physical location where an injury is incurred.
60. 33 U.S.C. § 902 (2013). The statute specifically excludes office clerks,
secretaries, security personnel, data processors, individuals employed by clubs,
camps, recreational operations, restaurants, museums or retail outlets, aquaculture
workers, seamen, persons building, repairing or dismantling recreational vessels
under 65 feet in length, workers engaged by a master to load or unload a small
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Congress amended Section 903 by broadening the definition of “navigable
waters of the United States” to “adjoining” land-based activities involving
vessels:
[C]ompensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of
disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or
death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters
of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry
dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining
area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading,
repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel).61
These amendments changed what was a strictly situs test for coverage
eligibility to one that looks to the situs of the injury in conjunction with
the status of the injured worker.62 The Supreme Court, in interpreting the

vessel under 18 tons, persons employed by suppliers, transporters, or vendors and
who are not engaged in work normally performed by the employees of the covered
employer, and individuals employed by marinas not engaged in the construction,
replacement, or expansion of the marina, notwithstanding routine maintenance.
33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(a–h) (2013). Workers engaged in building repairing or
dismantling small vessels are generally excluded, unless the employer’s facility
receives federal maritime subsidies or if the worker is not subject to coverage
under state workers’ compensation structures. 33 U.S.C. § 903(d)(2) (2013).
Finally, employees of the United States, any agency of the United States, or a state
or foreign government or any subdivision thereof are excluded from coverage. 33
U.S.C. § 903(b) (2013). The Benefits Review Board has defined the category of
coverage to harbor-workers as including employees directly involved in the
alteration, maintenance, repair, or construction of harbor facilities. Stewart v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 7 BRBS 356 (1978). Harbor facilities include piers, docks,
wharves, and adjacent areas used in the loading, unloading, repair, or construction
of vessels. Id.
61. 33 U.S.C. § 903 (2013). Theoretically the employer must also meet the
statutory definition of a qualified employer, though the courts question how
strictly this requirement applies. Cf. Hullinghorst Industries, Inc. v. Carroll, 650
F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1981); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini
North River Associates, 103 S. Ct. 634 (1983). See also, Denton, supra note 19,
at 11. Further exploration of this issue is outside the scope of this comment.
62. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264–65 (1977). Note
that a current split exists among the circuits related to the interpretation of
“adjoining land” with regard to the situs requirement. Some circuits have
determined that adjoining land means any area near water. See Brady-Hamilton
Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1978), and Sea–Land Service,
Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir.1976).
Others have found that injury must occur on a situs directly contiguous with
navigable waters. See New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker's
Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 394 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (overturning
Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc)),
and Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1995). While
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two prongs used in this new test, indicated that the status and situs
requirements, “while separate and distinct, should not be read to render the
other superfluous.”63 Status and situs do not overlap to the point that they
merge into one, but rather remain two independent, conjunctive
requirements for determining coverage.64
Although these amendments sought to remedy the problem of workers
walking in and out of coverage by extending coverage onto “adjoining
lands,” it was not Congress’ intention to cover “all those who breathe salt
air.”65 Rather, “[t]he expansion of the definition of navigable waters to
include rather large shore-side areas necessitated an affirmative
description of the particular employees working in those areas who would
be covered. This was the function of the maritime employment
requirement.”66
The legislative history confirms the conjunctive independence of the
two prongs, as evidenced in the Report by the House Committee on
Education and Labor, which delineates the exclusion of non-maritime
workers injured in the loading area:
The Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not
engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just
because they are injured in an area adjoining navigable waters
used for such activity. Thus, employees whose responsibility is
only to pick up stored cargo for further trans-shipment would not
be covered, nor would purely clerical employees whose jobs do
not require them to participate in the loading or unloading of
cargo. However, checkers, for example, who are directly involved
in the loading or unloading functions are covered by the new
amendment.67
The Supreme Court interpreted this comment to mean that Congress
intended status to define the scope of the newly extended landward
coverage.68
The addition of the status requirement particularly limited coverage of
land-based injuries incorporated by the new situs requirement. Congress
did not intend to deprive workers on the other side of the Jensen line of a
this circuit split awaits determination by the Supreme Court, it is the subject of
another paper altogether.
63. Bilisoly, supra note 35, at 518 (citing Herb's Welding v. Gray, 470 U.S.
414 (1985); Perini, 459 U.S. (1983)).
64. Herb's Welding, 470 U.S. at 426.
65. Id. at 450.
66. Id. at 423.
67. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4708; H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441, 11 (1972).
68. Perini, 459 U.S. at 317–18.

156

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. IV

remedy to which they would have otherwise had access under the original
LHWCA.69 The purpose of the amendments was, after all, to “extend
coverage to protect additional workers.”70 Still, the limited nature of that
extension was clear.
C. New Ambiguities Create an Unforeseen Burden
The implementation of the status requirement created new
ambiguities. Particularly, the 1972 Amendments failed to establish
sufficiently clear jurisdictional lines, and thus, confusion abounded as to
where federal jurisdiction ended and state jurisdiction began.71 This new
uncertainty led to a flood of expensive litigation that many in the industry
deemed unnecessary and unfair.72
The expansion of coverage predictably resulted in a substantial influx
of LHWCA claims, which proved to be costly for employers liable under
the Act.73 In 1978, LHWCA costs relative to payroll were more than
double those in other industries such as manufacturing, carpentry, foundry,
and logging.74 Expenses rose to 50% of total payroll costs, a staggering
number in comparison to the American average of 1.5%.75 The increased
burden imposed by the new amendments led many shippers to divert cargo
outside the United States in an effort to avoid LHWCA-related costs.76 A
Department of Commerce study reported that 7.4 million tons of cargo
were diverted to Canada between 1976 and 1979, resulting in a loss of $9.4
billion to the American economy.77 In the end, this exodus out of the
American market created an overall loss of jobs for American workers,
lost profits for their employers, and a hit to the national economy.78
69. Id. at 324 (establishing that LHWCA applies when a worker is injured on
navigable waters).
70. Id. at 316–17.
71. 1981 Hearing, supra note 13, at 5 (statement of Don Nickles, Senator of
Oklahoma).
72. Id.
73. 1981 Hearing, supra note 13, fig.14 (US Dep’t of Labor, Increase in
Claims and Benefit Levels Since 1972 Amendments to the Longshore Act).
Between 1972 and 1977, injuries reported under the Act increased by 185%,
jumping from 72,000 to 205,000 per year. Id.
74. 1981 Hearing, supra note 13, fig. 16 (US Dep’t of Labor, Final Report on
the Interagency Task Force on Workplace Safety and Health (December 14, 1978)).
75. Id.
76. 1981 Hearing, supra note 13, fig.16 (US Dep’t of Commerce, Longshore
Cost Promotes Diversion of U.S. Cargo).
77. Id.
78. One shipyard reported costs jumping from twenty percent to sixty
percent; under duress, the company “literally and figuratively packed their bags
and left Brooklyn.” 1981 Hearing, supra note 13, at 27 (statement of William L.
Gardner, representative of Braswell Shipyards, Inc.). In 1981, a bill was
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III. THE SUPREME COURT ATTEMPTS TO MAKE SENSE OF THE STATUS TEST
Immediately following the 1972 Amendments, confusion arose as to
what exactly “in the course of maritime employment” meant. In the years
that followed, the Supreme Court did substantial work in establishing clear
guidelines for judges and industry participants alike in defining the
maritime employment status test.79
First, the Court focused on the loading and unloading of cargo from a
vessel as the touchstone of maritime employment conducted on land.80 The
Court defined the unloading process as “taking cargo out of the hold,
moving it away from the ship’s side, and carrying it immediately to a
storage or holding area.”81 Accordingly, workers injured on the situs but
not involved in the overall process of loading and unloading ships were
not covered.82 The Court rejected the “point of rest” theory proffered by
the petitioners in Northeast Marine Terminal v. Caputo.83 While
petitioners argued that the loading process terminated as soon as cargo
landed on the pier, the Court found that this theory construed the definition
of loading and unloading too narrowly.84 Still, maritime unloading
required some “nexus with a vessel.”85
Next, the Court reiterated the importance of keeping the status and
situs requirements distinct. In P.C. Pfeiffer Company v. Ford, the Court
determined that the scope of the status test included “any worker who
moves cargo between ship and land transportation,” reasoning that such a
definition provided consistency and predictability for interpretation of the
status requirement.86 The holding in Pfeiffer comported with congressional
intent by focusing narrowly on the nature of the employment in assessing
status, rather than commingling status and situs in a single inquiry.87
introduced proposing to address these problems by amending the LHWCA. The
proposed amendment would delete the independent status and situs requirements
and instead employ a definition of status as incorporating both job activity and
location the time of injury. The bill, however, failed to pass. Longshoremen’s and
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments, S. 1182, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(May 14, 1981).
79. Kenneth G. Engerrand, LHWCA Coverage After New Orleans Depot
Services, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Twelfth Judge Alvin
B. Rubin Conference on Maritime Personal Injury Law 57 (April 11, 2014).
80. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
81. Id. at 266–67.
82. Id. at 267.
83. Id. at 277–78.
84. Id.
85. BPU Mgmt., Inc/Sherwin Alumina Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp.
Programs, 732 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2013) (interpreting Caputo, 432 U.S. at 267).
86. See P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 83–84 (1979).
87. See id. at 83.
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Moreover, the decision refrained from extending coverage to every worker
occupying the maritime situs, and thus retained the integrity of both status
and situs as individual inquiries.88 Further emphasizing this principle, in
Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, the Court reiterated the notion that the status
inquiry embodies an occupational test.89 Coverage could not be extended
to a laborer just because his place of work was an inherently maritime
location; the worker had to also be engaged in traditionally maritime
employment—duties conventionally relegated to longshoremen and
harbor workers.90
The Court issued its last clarification on the status requirement to date
in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Schwalb.91 In Schwalb, the claimants
participated in the loading process solely by performing repair and
maintenance services on loading equipment.92 The Court ruled that injuries
incurred during the repair and maintenance of equipment were covered by
the LHWCA, as long as they were integral to the loading and unloading
process.93 According to the Court:
Someone who repairs or maintains a piece of loading equipment
is just as vital to and an integral part of the loading process as the
operator of the equipment. When machinery breaks down or
becomes clogged or fouled because of the lack of cleaning, the
loading process stops until the difficulty is cured.94
Neither the absence of the worker’s continuous participation in
loading, nor the sporadic nature of the repair and maintenance, gave the
Court pause.95
The notion that a worker qualifies as a maritime employee when he
provides services essential to—but not directly involved in—the loading
process blurs the boundaries around the status test and muddies its
relationship to situs. It reopens ambiguities as to the scope of coverage,
threatens to consume most, if not all, of the exclusion of non-maritime
workers, and simply shifts the status inquiry to a determination of how
close or detached the non-loading function may be to the loading function.
Essentially, it creates a sliding spectrum with no fixed point separating
LHWCA coverage from non-coverage.
88. See id.
89. 470 U.S. 414, 424 (1985) (denying LHWCA coverage to a welder on a
stationary drilling platform located in state territorial waters).
90. Id. at 425,26.
91. 493 U.S. 40 (1989).
92. Id. at 46.
93. Id. at 47.
94. 493 U.S. 40, 47 (1989).
95. Id.
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IV. TIME MARCHES ON: A TEST DEVOID OF TEMPORALITY
A piece of cargo must pass through many hands in order to travel from
a factory in Asia to a warehouse in New Orleans. Days, upon weeks, upon
months of work must be accomplished in order to make its voyage
possible. But not every worker who lifts a hammer in furtherance of the
cargo’s journey does so in the scope of maritime employment. Likewise,
not every task that facilitates the loading and unloading of cargo in a port
should be covered by the LHWCA. For example, a worker who fits a pipe
on a barren lot that will be used to load oil onto a tanker in five years time
should not be considered to be engaged in maritime employment, even if
that lot was at one point a loading dock, and one day will be again. Of
course, without this task completed, loading could not be accomplished.
However, status under the LHWCA is not a but-for test.96 The Act never
intended compensation to reach a worker of this sort who was not engaged
in traditional longshoring activities, and extending coverage to him and
other workers in similar positions leads to absurd results and an
unacceptable strain on the industry by inflating its financial liabilities to
otherwise ineligible workers.
A. The Subtle Incorporation of Temporal Considerations in Supreme
Court Precedent
While Caputo rejected the point of rest theory, the Court characterized
a qualified worker participating in the loading process as one who carried
cargo “immediately . . . to a storage or holding area.”97 Caputo borrows
this language directly from the House Report on the 1972 Amendments.98
There, Congress emphasized that “cargo, whether in break bulk or
containerized form, is typically unloaded from the ship and immediately
transported to a storage or holding area on the pier, wharf, or terminal
adjoining navigable waters.”99 The use of the word “immediately”
suggests that Congress intended for timing to play a role in determining
whether a worker is functioning in the course of maritime employment
when facilitating the loading and unloading of a vessel. While the point of
rest theory proffered by the petitioners in Caputo may not be the
appropriate test, a line must be drawn somewhere.

96. New Orleans Depot Servs. v. Dir., Office of Worker's Comp. Programs,
718 F.3d 384, 396 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Clement, J., concurring).
97. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 266–67 (1977)
(emphasis added).
98. See 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4708.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
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Similarly, P.C. Pfeiffer asserted a limitation on the temporal
attenuation of the connection between the vessel and loading with regards
to the status inquiry. In keeping with congressional intent, the Court was
careful not to extend coverage to every worker within the situs area.100 The
Court emphatically stated, “neither the driver of the truck carrying cotton
to Galveston nor the locomotive engineer transporting military vehicles
from Beaumont was engaged in maritime employment even though he was
working on the marine situs.”101 A person integral to loading, but only by
means of furthering terrestrial shipment of cargo, did not possess sufficient
ties to the loading process to satisfy the status test.102 The Court
acknowledged the absurdity of attenuating the connection between the
employee and the vessel.103 This connection implicitly requires that the
ship and laborer occupy roughly the same space at the same time. In other
words, a worker needs to be actively engaged in the loading of vessels to
be considered a maritime worker.
The success of loading and unloading operations must turn on the
worker effectively carrying out his duties. This understanding of maritime
employment is illustrated in the Schwalb opinion, where the Court
emphasized that the loading and unloading process actually stopped for
repairs and that the employee’s supervisor urged the worker to hurry up so
that loading might continue.104 “The determinative consideration,” the
Court asserted, “is that the ship loading process could not continue unless
the retarder that [the machinist] worked on was operating properly.”105 In
so ruling, the Court implied that the maintenance and repair of the
equipment must be directly and temporally connected to the actual
cessation of a specified loading or unloading task. Because the Court cites
this temporality consideration as determinative, it should not be
considered dicta, but rather incorporated into the status analysis.
B. Circuit Courts Watch the Clock
Judges in the lower courts have acknowledged the role of temporality
in assessing status eligibility and established jurisprudential support for a

100. P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 83 (1979).
101. Id.
102. Id. Cf. Boudloche v. Howard Trucking Co. 632 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1980),
(extending LHWCA coverage to a driver who loaded cargo onto the ship five
percent of the time). Carrying cargo from the ship to land-based transportation
constitutes maritime employment, whereas simply driving the vehicle involved in
further transportation does not.
103. Pfeiffer, 444 U.S. at 83.
104. Schwalb, 493 U.S. at 48.
105. Id.
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reading of Schwalb that requires immediacy.106 This position is perhaps
most explicitly and eloquently explained in the concurrence offered by
Judge Clement in New Orleans Depot Services v. Director, Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs.107
In her concurring opinion, Judge Clement asserts that the original New
Orleans Depot panel misread Schwalb, cutting it off from its roots.108
Schwalb turned on the fact that workers conducting repair and
maintenance participate in the loading process “because the actual process,
once begun, would be arrested in the absence of their contributions.”109
According to Judge Clement, the panel erred because Schwalb does not
demand that
all employees who repair any equipment that may be used in the
loading process are similarly integral. If this were the inquiry, it
would only be a short step to the conclusion that a manufacturer
of shoes or walkie talkies should be covered, because, arguably,
the modern loading process cannot be accomplished without those
items.110
Judge Clement pointed out the error in interpreting the LHWCA as
providing a but-for status test by highlighting the absurdity of the temporal
attenuation it would cause.111 Instead, the inquiry should look to the duties
of a traditional longshoreman in loading and unloading a vessel. For
example, repairing his own tools would qualify a longshoreman for
106. See generally New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker's
Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Sidwell v. Va. Int'l
Terminals, Inc., 372 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2004); In re Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 592 F.3d
907 (8th Cir. 2010).
107. New Orleans Depot, 718 F.3d at 394–99 (Clement, concurring). The
majority opinion in New Orleans Depot was decided based on a failure to meet the
situs requirement, overturning the long-standing test set forth in Texports Stevedore
Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 518 (5th Cir. 1980). Id. at 394. In her concurrence,
Judge Clement suggested that her opinion was not dictum, but rather binding as an
alternative holding. Id. at 394 (Clement, J. concurring). Her assertion was incorrect,
as Judge Clement failed to achieve a majority by one vote. Id.
108. Id. at 396. The en banc decision in New Orleans Depot overturned the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals earlier decision that held that a container repairman
operating at a site detached from the loading site met both the status and situs
requirements under the LHWCA. New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office
of Worker's Comp. Programs, 689 F.3d 400, 407 (5th Cir. 2012) reh'g en banc
granted sub nom.
109. New Orleans Depot, 718 F.3d at 396 (emphasis added). The Fourth
Circuit expressed a similar reading in Sidwell, 372 F.3d at 243 (arguing that the
standard proposed in Schwalb that the loading process could not continue “makes
the capacity to interrupt ongoing long-shoring activities paramount.”).
110. New Orleans Depot, 718 F.3d at 396 (Clement, concurring).
111. Id.
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coverage, but repairing a shipping container not necessarily destined for a
vessel would not.112 While containers may affect the loading and
unloading process, their repair is not within the customary duties of
longshoremen.113 Rather, satisfaction of the status test requires that repair
or maintenance of equipment be “one step in the direct chain of unloading
a ship . . . when ‘the maintenance men would [halt] the entire loading
process’ if they were not available for the repair.”114 In the New Orleans
Depot concurrence, Judge Clement argued that, where a welder repaired
containers that may have been destined for shipping, but had never even
witnessed a vessel being loaded, much less assisted in the process, no
coverage could be provided due to his lack of status as a maritime
worker.115 Such a worker was “a far cry from the paradigmatic
longshoreman who walked in and out of coverage during his workday.”116
Shortly after New Orleans Depot, a panel of Fifth Circuit jurists
seemed to endorse Judge Clement’s view on the status test. In BPU
Management/Sherwin Alumina Company v. Director, Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs, the court found that a worker injured while
cleaning a cross-tunnel in a bauxite production facility did not qualify for
coverage under the LHWCA.117 The court held that cleaning the tunnel
was not integral to loading and unloading in spite of the fact that, if the
tunnel filled up, loading and unloading would have to stop.118 Because it
would have taken an excessively long time for the tunnel to fill up
substantially enough to interfere with loading, the court reasoned that
cleaning the tunnel could not be viewed as part of the direct chain of
loading and unloading a vessel.119 Further, the facility stockpiled bauxite
for years, so its storage on the site could hardly be defined as a step in the
loading process.120 The underlying implication of this analysis is that some
expiration date exists in applying the status test to activities facilitating
loading and unloading.
Not every activity that facilitates the eventual shipping of cargo over
navigable waters is maritime in nature. Improper application of the status
test threatens to bring about that absurd result. The Eighth Circuit resisted
this overly broad interpretation of Schwalb in In re Norfolk Southern
112. See id. at 396–97.
113. Id. The customary duties Judge Clement refers to are undoubtedly the
actual physical loading and unloading of the vessel.
114. Id. at 397 (citing Sea–Land Serv., Inc. v. Rock, 953 F.2d 56, 67 (3d
Cir.1992)).
115. Id. at 397–98.
116. Id.(citing Herb's Welding v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 427 (1985)).
117. 732 F.3d 457, 465 (5th Cir. 2013).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 464.
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Railway Company.121 In that case, the court refused coverage to workers
who switched railroad cars full of coal onto the correct tracks to deliver
them to the dumpers that would be used to load the coal onto ships.122
Because the claimants worked with the cars before the loading process
began and did not initiate their descent to the coal dumpers, the court found
that their tasks were not sufficiently linked to the loading process.123 It was
not enough that their activities were generally essential to shipping the
cargo; rather, to be covered under LHWCA, workers’ activities must have
a direct nexus with actually loading the vessel.124
C. The Benefits Review Board Starts Keeping Time
Decisions issued by the Benefits Review Board (BRB), the
administrative tribunal adjudicating LHWCA claims, have drawn several
time-based distinctions related to the status inquiry.125 First, the Board
distinguished the difference between present and future involvement in
maritime activities; it is not enough to establish that work contributes to
some function that will, at some point in the future, be involved in loading
and unloading cargo.126 Instead, to qualify as a maritime employee, a
laborer’s duties must be directly associated with contemporaneous loading
and unloading. In conducting this future/present analysis, the BRB has
taken into account the transitory nature of employment. Specifically,
121. 592 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 2010).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Congress created the Benefits Review Board in 1972 to adjudicate
appeals of administrative judges’ decisions related to claims arising under the
LHWCA and the Black Lung Benefits amendments to the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Benefits Review Board
Mission Statement, www.dol.gov/brb/mission.htm (last visited October 9, 2014).
The Board consists of five members appointed by the Secretary of Labor. Id. BRB
decisions can be appealed to the circuit court in the circuit where the injury
occurred. Id. Courts generally show no deference to BRB decisions; these cases
represent a trend in the industry that needs to be taken up by the courts.
126. See, e.g., Weyher/Livsey Constructors, Inc. v. Prevetire, 27 F.3d 985,
989–90 (4th Cir. 1994) (where a pipe fitter injured while building a power plant
was not within maritime employment when his only connection to maritime
activity was the fact that energy from the power plant he helped build would
eventually be used by a shipyard); Moon v. Tidewater Constr. Co., 35 BRBS 151
(2001) (where construction of a building that would be used as a storage facility
in the future was not uniquely maritime employment). Cf. Kerby v. Southeastern
Public Service Authority, 31 BRBS 6 (1997), aff’d mem., 135 F.3d 770 (4th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 816 (1998) (where workers at a power plant that
provided power to a shipyard were found to be involved in maritime employment
because the maintenance and repair was integral to the loading and unloading
process).
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where a claimant’s relationship to a maritime facility is temporary or timelimited, LHWCA coverage is not appropriate, even if his work may further
the loading and unloading of vessels in the future.127 This qualification
rests on the understanding that the employee will not be present when the
actual loading and unloading necessary to confer status occurs.128
Second, the BRB has emphasized the importance of some temporal
nexus with the vessel to satisfy the status test. While it is not necessary
that a worker actually handle cargo, some nexus must exist between their
activities and the actual loading of the ship.129 Case law and administrative
proceedings like these illuminate the need to connect the status
requirement with a finite place in time in order to clearly and reasonably
delineate boundaries to LHWCA coverage.
V. ADDRESSING STATUS AMBIGUITY THROUGH TEMPORAL
CONSTRAINTS
Tension exists between a broad definition of maritime labor that
includes all those activities integral to loading and unloading and a tighter
definition of maritime labor that relies on the immediacy referred to in
Caputo and Schwalb. Resolving this tension is crucial to establishing a
compensation structure that benefits laborers, employers, and the industry
as a whole. In order to determine an appropriate application of the status
test, statutory language, congressional intent, and policy concerns must be
considered. Doing so will lead to an interpretation of status that is narrower
than blanket coverage yet broad enough to incorporate all deserving
parties. A legislative revision drafted with these goals in mind will best
serve the viability of LHWCA compensation in the future.
Notwithstanding congressional action, a just remedy to the problem of
status may be accorded through appropriate judicial and practical
application of the current Act.
127. Southcombe v. A Mark, B Mark, C Mark Corp., 37 BRBS 169 (2003)
(where a claimant involved in the construction of a facility that would have future
maritime use was not covered because his relationship to the facility was
temporary, lasting only until construction was completed).
128. Balonek v. Texcom, Inc., 43 BRBS 153 (2009) (finding claimant’s
temporary presence at the shipyard was not covered, even though the cable system
he installed would later be used in maritime functions: Future use cannot confer
coverage).
129. Terlemezian v. J.H. Reid General Contracting, 37 BRBS 112 (2003)
(holding that no nexus existed between a road project to improve land
transportation at a shipping facility and the actual task of loading the ship); cf.
Ruffin v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 36 BRBS 52 (2002)
(providing coverage to a worker injured while loading machinery was in operation
and the claimant had to wear a hard hat and safety goggles).
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A. Temporality Imposes Boundaries that Congress Intended
Congressional intent regarding status has been misconstrued, resulting
in an erroneous application of the LHWCA statute. Based on the idea that
Congress intended to expand—not limit—coverage through the 1972
Amendments, scholars have advocated for a broad reading of the twopronged test. According to one such scholar, “[t]he Benefits Review Board
has embarked on a slippery road of analyzing shipyard workers status by
creating a new test for coverage instead of relying on the statutory
language.”130 Under his theory, the overarching intent of the Act was to
resolve jurisdictional anomalies by expanding coverage.131
While it is true that Congress intended to expand coverage under the
1972 Amendments, this reading is overly simplistic. To read the statute
accordingly conflates the status and situs tests. The amended situs test
indeed intended to expand coverage; therefore, in analyzing the situs
requirement, a broad interpretation may be appropriate.132 Status,
however, served the function of a limiting clause. As such, it follows that
the status requirement should be read narrowly. As Justice Stevens
proffered in his Perini dissent, “[in] this statute, the subcategories—
longshoremen and harbor workers—are both described in detail, and no
other subcategory is even mentioned, giving rise to an especially strong
inference that Congress intended a snug fit between ‘maritime
employment’ and the two subcategories.”133 The incorporation of the
status test into the 1972 Amendments meant to rein in the expansion of
situs; this “snug fit,” therefore, seems a more appropriate interpretation.
To stay true to congressional intent, courts need only look to the plain
language of the statute. The Act states that maritime employment is related
to traditional longshoring tasks, like loading and unloading. No reason
exists to read more into that definition than what the words plainly state.
Elucidating a trend toward strict construction within the Fifth Circuit,
noted scholar Kenneth Engerrand explained, “[t]he full court has
expressed its intent to apply the LHWCA as written, and not to give liberal
construction that departs from the plain language of the Act . . . and
continues the Fifth Circuit’s course toward rejection of policy arguments

130. Thomas C. Fitzhugh III, Who Is Covered? Recent Cases Regarding
Longshore Situs and Status, 16 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 265, 279–80 (2004).
131. Id. at 318.
132. Alternatively, the expansion of situs over land might be best interpreted
as a jurisdictional gap-filler. No arguments regarding the appropriate means of
situs analysis are asserted here.
133. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459
U.S. 297, 327 (1983) (Stevens, dissenting) (emphasis added).
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proffered to circumvent the plain language in the LHWCA.”134 This trend
in the Fifth Circuit flows from the Supreme Court’s assertion of “the basic
and unexceptional rule that courts must give effect to the clear meaning of
statutes as written.”135 Reading the status requirement in an overly broad
manner exceeds the scope of the actual language of the LHWCA. Such a
reading unduly favors the policy interest of expanding coverage, while
failing to give substantial credence to the actual language and intent of
Congress in enacting the statute.
B. Prioritizing the Wrong Policy: Predictability Trumps Expanded
Coverage
If any policy is to be favored over the statutory language, it is not the
predisposition towards expanded coverage. Upholding a policy of
expansion ignores an even more important policy concern: that of
predictability and uniformity of coverage. The LHWCA (or any other
workers’ compensation system, for that matter) is rendered useless without
predictability. History has shown that “[m]ore than perhaps any other
statutory scheme, a worker’s compensation statute should be geared
toward a non-litigious, speedy, sure resolution of the compensation claims
of injured workers.”136 A framework that facilitates the predictability and
uniform application of that coverage benefits all parties across the
spectrum.
First, it is axiomatic that, in the case of injury, a worker is best served
by receiving benefits in a timely fashion. The principal purpose of
workers’ compensation is to provide support to a worker who loses wages
and incurs medical expenses as a result of injury in the workplace. Such
support cannot be provided, nor can those expenses be compensated, if
disputes over coverage keep a claim tied up in court for years.
Second, employers benefit from the speedy and efficient resolution of
claims. An employer bears the onerous costs of litigation for claims that
are disputed throughout the administrative and judicial systems. Providing
clear workers’ compensation benefits allows an employer to maintain a
satisfied and protected workforce, control costs of production, and avoid
exorbitant litigation costs.

134. Engerrand, supra note 79, at 60.
135. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992).
136. Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 518 (5th Cir. 1980)
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting), overruled by New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir.,
Office of Worker's Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The
majority in New Orleans Depot agreed with this premise, stating, “One could
hardly imagine an area where predictability is more important.” 718 F.3d at 394.
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Finally, predictability of coverage serves a broader economic interest
in a workers’ compensation system:
The employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially; it is
expected that this cost will eventually pass down the stream of
commerce in the form of increased price until it is spread in
dilution among the ultimate consumers. So long as each
competing unit in a given industry is uniformly affected, no
producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or suffer
any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the
compensation principle.137
The distribution of burden across the industry absorbs harm to
individual employers, and in turn, the economy. When this balance is
disturbed by inconsistencies in coverage and liability, the result is
detrimental to individual business owners and the industry as a whole.
Furthermore, uncertainty regarding application of the LHWCA leads to
increased costs related to resolution of claims, which in turn leads to
increased production costs. These costs eventually trickle down to the
consumer.
C. Improving Section 902 through Revision Incorporating Temporality
Concerns related to predictability and uniformity in LHWCA
application may easily be addressed by a simple statutory revision.
Activities related to the loading and unloading of vessels should be part of
a direct chain. As such, Congress should amend the LHWCA to redefine
the definition of employee in Section 902 to read:
The term ‘employee’ means any person engaged in maritime
employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged
in longshoring operations, insofar as their duties are conducted in
the course of, and are necessary to, the direct loading and
unloading of cargo onto a vessel, and any harbor-worker including
a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-breaker . . . .138
This solution suggests grafting the language employed in state
workers’ compensation statutes onto the employee definition to achieve a
targeted timing nexus. In other state workers’ compensation statutes, “in
the course of” generally denotes a requisite closeness between a worker’s

137. Malone, supra note 19, at 34–35.
138. See 33 U.S.C. § 902 (2013) (emphasized language added).

168

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. IV

injury and employment.139 Here, the same language is incorporated to
impose a similarly close relationship between the activities of the worker
and the actual loading and unloading process.140 The language narrows
coverage in regards to a point in time and space.141 Still, it provides a
cushion so as to prevent a caustic application of coverage: “A reasonable
time is allowed before and after the assumption of duties, especially when
the employee is on the premises either preparing for work or leaving it.”142
Requiring that longshoring activities be done in the course of loading
or unloading a vessel creates a direct and temporal link to the actual
process. It prevents an overly attenuated extension of coverage to workers,
while keeping in line with the cessation of loading described in Schwalb.
The new language clarifies application of the statute. It reads the Act
narrowly enough to prevent over-coverage that could be harmful to
workers and the industry alike, while still allowing for enough flexibility
to continue providing coverage to workers outside actual loading and
unloading duties, such as maintenance and repair integral to the immediate
loading process. Revising the text thus inserts the necessary temporal
immediacy suggested by the courts since the 1972 Amendments.

139. See generally, Stewart v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 13-193 (La. App. 5 Cir.
10/9/13), 128 So. 3d 398, 405 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (“The requirement that an
employee's injury occur “in the course of” employment focuses on the time and
place relationship between the injury and the employment.”); Martin v. Applied
Cellular Tech., Inc., 284 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002) (asserting “[T]hat the injury
arose in the course of employment by demonstrating that (A) it occurred within
the boundaries of time and space created by the terms of employment; and (B) it
occurred in the performance of an activity . . . if reasonably expected and not
forbidden, or an activity of mutual benefit to employer and employee.”); Crowe
v. Blum, 9 F.3d 32, 34 (7th Cir. 1993) (“An injury occurs “in the course” of
employment if the time, place and circumstances indicate that it was suffered
while the injured employee was furthering the ends of the employer.”).
140. This requirement would only apply to assessing whether the general
duties of a worker throughout the course of his employment were maritime in
nature; it should not be read so congruently with state remedies to assume that the
worker must actually be injured while carrying out these duties. Rather, such
duties must simply make up a substantial part of his work responsibilities. To read
otherwise would simply create a new system in which workers would
continuously walk in and out of coverage.
141. Mayer, supra note 27, at 56.
142. Id. See, e.g., Sanders v. Kirby, 171 So. 2d 281, 284 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1965)
(awarding workers’ compensation for a worker injured on the job site while
preparing to begin work in ten minutes and discussing the tasks of the day with
his supervisor). Cf. Tarver v. Energy Drilling Co. 645 So.2d 796 (La. App. 2 Cir.
1994) (denying workers’ compensation to an employee injured in a car accident
while travelling from the work site to a temporary employee housing unit
provided by his employer).
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1. Familiar Terms of Art Foster Ease of Application in the Courts
As courts are accustomed to applying the language associated in
this statutory revision in other workers’ compensation claims, judges
should not have difficulty applying the new LHWCA amendment.
Interpretation of the term “in the course of” would employ the same
standard exercised in state workers’ compensation adjudications; only
here it would be used in relation to the loading and unloading of ships.
A critical analysis of the proposed legislation identifies only two
potential pitfalls associated with the amendment: myopia and the
incentivization of inaction. These weaknesses, however, are not
inherent to the actual letter of the law, but instead result from a
wrongful interpretation of the amended language.
First, a myopic reading of the new language risks construction that
is too narrow, thus excluding a class of workers that might otherwise
be covered under the superior benefits of the LHWCA. After all, are
there not other tasks completed by maritime workers that are not
directly related to the loading and unloading of the vessel?
Additionally, what if a worker does load and unload vessels, but is
injured while conducting some other duty?
The answer to this problem of judicial tunnel vision is two-fold.
First, the plain text of the LHWCA accounts for most of these other
various jobs in different, unrevised sections of the Act.143 Second, the
newly revised language of the statute does not necessitate an evaluation
of the activity of the worker at the moment of his injury to determine
coverage. To read the language as such would wrongly conflate the use
of the language in the state statutes with its use and purpose here. In
state statutes “in the course of” describes what one is doing at the time
of injury, while in the proposed revision, “in the course of” defines
what duties are part of maritime employment in general. Once it is
established that a worker’s employment qualifies as maritime based on
duties conducted in the course of loading and unloading a vessel, he
will be eligible for the LHWCA. If he is completing some other task at
the moment he is injured, it is of no concern; he is nonetheless a
maritime employee.144 In other words, if a worker’s duties involve a
143. 33 USCS § 902 (“any harbor-worker including a ship repairman,
shipbuilder, and ship-breaker”); 33 USCS § 903 (“repairing, dismantling, or
building a vessel”).
144. To illustrate this point, a worker whose primary responsibility is to load
cargo on a ship would still be covered, even if he were sweeping out a storage
container on a covered situs when he was injured. He was injured in the course of
his employment, and his employment is maritime in nature. His employment is
maritime in nature because his duties generally are conducted in the course of
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tight temporal connection with the loading of a ship, then his job
description is “maritime employee.” Once that status attaches, he
remains a maritime employee throughout the course of his workday,
regardless of his particular actions at the time of injury.
Judge Higginson focused upon the second pitfall of tight
temporality in his dissent to New Orleans Depot.145 The problem arises
from a reading of Schwalb that denies coverage to workers repairing
and maintaining equipment unless loading is interrupted for the repair.
Judge Higginson argued that such a rule would foster inefficiency in
the industry by incentivizing reactivity.146 Instead of being proactive
and keeping equipment in good running order, workers would prefer to
wait until equipment breaks so that the loading process is interrupted
and coverage is ensured. The statutory revision here avoids that strange
result by allowing some flexibility in temporality. Adding “in the
course of” to the statute creates a cushion of time on either side of the
loading and unloading processes, during which repairs could
reasonably be made and still be covered under the LHWCA. Still, that
cushion is a small one—it would not be allowed to extend maritime
status beyond those repairs immediately necessary to loading and
unloading.147 Put simply, repair and maintenance must be done to
facilitate the actual task of loading or unloading a particular vessel.
An appropriate reading of the proposed statutory language avoids
these pitfalls while allowing for a time-limited application of the status
requirement. Because this proposed amendment is familiar language to
judges, its application should be straightforward and consistent, as long
as it is appropriately interpreted to modify the assessment of
employment status and not read so constrictively as to torpedo efficient
operations.

loading and unloading vessels; the fact that he was not loading the ship at the time
of injury is irrelevant.
145. Judge Higginson decried Judge Clement’s concurrence because her
application prevented workers who kept machines running smoothly from
receiving benefits. New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker's
Comp. Programs 718 F.3d 384, 404 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Higginson,
dissenting). According to Judge Higginson, under Judge Clement’s reading of
Schwalb, workers would have to wait for machinery to break before fixing it to
meet the tight temporal construct Clement suggested. Id.
146. Id.
147. For example, in a traditional state workers’ compensation case, an
employee may be considered “in the course of” employment when he is preparing
his tools before beginning his duties, but he is not “in the course of” his
employment when he is brushing his teeth in the morning and readying for work.
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2. No Time to Wait: Addressing the Harms of Unbounded
Temporality Today
Revising the LHWCA status requirement to incorporate a temporal
element is the ideal solution to the problem of determining coverage
for injured maritime workers. Realistically, however, a statutory
revision does not appear to be looming on the horizon—the LHWCA has
only been amended twice in its almost ninety year history.148 As such,
courts and practitioners should not wait on Congress to establish a
temporal boundary to coverage. To do so would sacrifice the interests of
injured workers and their employers and cause harm to an industry integral
to the national economy.
Furthermore, waiting for congressional action is not necessary. The
plain language of the statute bears sufficient authority. The LHWCA
already requires that the injury in question occur in the course of
employment, just as other workers’ compensation structures do.149 The
Act requires employment to be maritime in nature.150 Finally, Section
903(a) expressly describes the conventional activities that fall within the
scope of employment as “loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling or
building a vessel.”151 No reason stands to extend this language beyond its
most straightforward meaning: Coverage only applies to those injuries
incurred by employees who are actively engaged in the actual loading of
a vessel (among the other tasks listed).
Any further attenuation unnecessarily complicates application of the
compensation structure. Expansion of the statute beyond this simple
reading could not possibly be based on the letter of the law, but rather on
some unfounded desire to extend coverage under the LHWCA farther than
ever intended. Congress explicitly intended the statute to apply to those
tasks “immediately” related to unloading, as they stated clearly in the 1972
Amendments.152
An appropriate interpretation of the case law also supports this
reading. In Caputo, Pfeiffer, and Schwalb, the Supreme Court emphasized
the tight link between the worker’s employment and the loading and
unloading process. A requirement of immediacy is inferred. Courts should
plainly read Schwalb’s assertion that the actual cessation of a particular
148. In addition to the amendments discussed here, the LHWCA was amended
once more in 1984, on grounds unrelated to the subject matter at hand. Longshore
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L No. 92576, 98 Stat. 1639.
149. 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (2015).
150. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3).
151. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a).
152. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4708.
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task was determinative. This is not dicta: Temporality is determinative.
While a clear assertion from Congress confirming the existence of a
conservative temporal limit on LHWCA status is preferred, the same
results can, and must, be reached by the judiciary.
CONCLUSION
The maritime industry remains the bedrock of the United States,
both in terms of heritage and current economic and political impact.
The industry thrives due to the hard work of American maritime
laborers. Thus, the health of the United States is intimately entwined
with the health of these men and women. The LHWCA provides
maritime laborers with a safety net in case they get hurt on the job.
American lawmakers are responsible for ensuring that this safety net
does not have any holes.
As it stands today, the LHWCA has one gaping hole that
unnecessarily strains the industry and its workers. That hole exists in
the lack of clarity regarding how to apply the status test for coverage.
Particularly, how attenuated may an employee’s relationship to loading
and unloading be to qualify for coverage?
Incorporating, through statutory amendment, a temporal
component to the status inquiry answers this question while achieving
coverage that is both more beneficial to the maritime shipping industry
and more in keeping with the intents of the statute. Moreover, no
substantial harm would result: Those excluded from coverage would be
those for whom federal coverage was never intended. Such individuals
could seek compensation under the state compensation structures
designed to protect them, and in so doing avoid the risks of lengthy and
unsuccessful litigation. Until such amendment takes effect, the courts
should embrace the temporality test as the best way to achieve the
clarity Congress sought, but failed to attain, in 1972. The stakes are
simply too high to wait for another amendment.
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The temptation always exists to stretch a statute to meet the facts of a
sympathetic case. However, doing so results in absurd and harmful
conclusions, even for those workers exclusively covered by state law.
Stretching the statute means also stretching—and weakening—
predictability in the adjudication of claims. Attenuating coverage may
seem benevolent and equitable to a sympathetic judge that aims to
compensate a maimed and despondent worker. In the end, a broad
application hurts both the employee seeking immediate remedy and his
employer, who bears the brunt of heightened litigation costs. A plain
reading of statutory language, interpretation of congressional intent, and
careful analysis of Supreme Court precedent insists upon a narrow
temporal construction in assessing status under the LHWCA. Industry
workers, courts, and administrative bodies must determine eligibility for
LHWCA compensation accordingly in order to ensure the continued
health of the industry and its workers.
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